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Every genuine rebirth seeking to return to some original principle, every genuine ritornar 
al principio, every return to pure, uncorrupted nature appears as cultural or social 
nothingness to the comfort and ease of the status quo.  It grows silently and in darkness, 
and a historian or sociologist would recognize only nothingness in its initial phases.  The 
moment of brilliant representation is also and at one the moment in which every link to 





Origin is not, therefore, discovered by the examination of actual findings, but it is related 
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Introduction 
 
The Book of Exodus tells the story of the Israelites’ flight from Egypt and their 
escape from slavery. Their fate was not yet their own; until God, maker of miracles, 
parted the Red Sea, the truth of their identity remained unclear.  The miracle of Exodus 
established in public belief that the Israelites were not slaves, they were, quite the 
contrary; they were His chosen people, his most beloved.  With his single gesture, God 
interrupted the laws of nature, indicating that a time had ended for the Israelites and 
something entirely new had begun. Thinking against the theological grain, Baruch 
Spinoza challenged the truth of Biblical miracles.  Spinoza argued that people believed in 
miracles, not because the event was true, but because of an author’s skillful use of poetic 
devices that appealed to the imagination of those who considered the fantastic to be more 
valid than the normal.  Humankind concocted stories such as these, continued Spinoza, to 
convince people that they were special, more beloved than others by God.  Spinoza was 
not alone in his attack on the miracle’s validity; David Hume too argued that a miracle 
could not be considered valid unless its falsehood was established as more miraculous 
than its truth. The doubt cast, by rationalists and empiricists, upon the credibility of 
religious symbols and myths initiated their descent from the public sphere.   
The work of Enlightenment philosophers, like Spinoza and Hume, was one 
catalyst of the disincorporation of church and state.  The church’s disempowerment and 
lost influence in political affairs initiated a new era.  The responsibility of defining rules 
and making laws in the modern world was assumed by, among others, the political 
scientists, and the sociologists who did so with the use of empirical knowledge and 
reason.  They began to analyze the laws of the seen world and the make-up of the human 
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being, judging mankind to be of either devious or benevolent nature and mind.  Scientific 
concepts, however, only scraped the surface in their effort to describe phenomenon of the 
modern world.  Political philosophers were left grasping for conceptualizations that 
allowed them to talk and write about the human condition without denying something 
vital to human identity, something that neither science nor reason sufficiently explained.   
The inadequacy of sociological and theoretical terms was apparent in thinkers’ more 
creative conceptualizations, which tried to explain phenomenon of the modern world that 
were antagonistic to its rational and factual order.  In an attempt to fill the void in modern 
thought, contemporary thinkers like Hent de Vries, have suggested that we reexamine the 
significance of religion in a world, which is “much less post-metaphysical or post-
traditional than it is post-secular.”3 
The reexamination of religion’s place in modern society elicited memory of those 
who argued that it never really went away.  Hegel claimed that it would be a mistake to 
assume that religion could disappear from the world that humans share.  More recently, 
Claude Lefort and Hent de Vries have claimed that religion has been around, even if 
hidden, since its initial conception.  Lefort argues that religion reemerges when a 
weakness in the democratic order allows it to break through the “edifice of the state” and 
reintroduce itself in the public sphere. De Vries argues that religious symbols and myths 
can show themselves in other ways too.  Religious representations, he claims, are part of 
our collective consciousness, even if they are now only part of private life.  De Vries 
suggests that there are new possibilities for old myths, that a crisis should not be 
necessitated to impulsively call them forth.  We can, he argues, intentionally crack open 
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the archive of Christian symbols and myths and use them to take us forward.  If we 
accept the claims of those like Hegel and Lefort, that religion is still present in our world, 
a world that modern theoretical concepts fall short in assessing, we have license to follow 
the suggestion of de Vries and examine old ideas, to discuss what they once meant and to 
identify their survival in and potential for interpreting a secular world.   
 A good place to begin an examination of theological traces in modern thought is 
with the work of Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin.  Both believed that religion survived 
in the secular state.  Schmitt argued in his 1922 book, Political Theology, that all modern 
concepts and systems were secularized theological ones.  Benjamin claimed, in his 1928 
The Origin of German Tragic Drama, that, besides religious concepts and systems, 
religious aspirations also remained, although the twentieth “century denied them a 
religious fulfillment, demanding of them, or imposing upon them, a secular solution 
instead.”4  Benjamin and Schmitt each had their own redemptive aspirations, and each 
wrote to save an aspect of human identity in the modern state.  While Schmitt fought to 
preserve the European state form from its domestic and international threats, Benjamin 
tried to save the human’s capacity to think in an age of fragmentation.  Both 
conceptualized the miracle as an interruption in the edifice of the status quo and an 
attempt to redeem an aspect of modern man’s identity. 
The Biblical miracles and its twentieth century version both redeemed mankind 
by initiating a new thought or belief.  For example, the Israelites found redemption in a 
phenomenon that aligned their collective belief with the revealed truth of their common 
identity.  Even in Spinoza’s account of the miracle as the poetic concoction of an 
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individual with a flourishing pen, man found redemption by thinking differently than 
before.  Although Benjamin and Schmitt conceptualize the miracle differently and intend 





The connection between Benjamin and Schmitt is not incidental.  Benjamin wrote 
the following letter to Schmitt in 1930, indicating that his book was indebted to the 
professor’s work:  
 
Distinguished Herr Professor,  
 You will be receiving in a few days from the publisher my book, Origin of the 
German Mourning Play.  With these lines I would like not simply to announce its arrival, 
but also express my joy at being able to send it to you, at the suggestion of Mr. Albert 
Salomon.  You will quickly see how much the book owes you in its presentation of the 
seventeenth-century doctrine of sovereignty.  Perhaps I may go even further and say that 
in your later works as well, above all in “Dictatorship,” your mode of research in the 
realm of political philosophy has confirmed my own mode of research in matters 
concerning the philosophy of art.  If in reading my book this feeling seems 
comprehensible to you, the purpose of my sending it will have been fulfilled. 
 With the expression of particular esteem, 
Your very devoted 
Walter Benjamin5  
 
Benjamin was born in Berlin in 1892 to a family of liberal yet not fully 
assimilated Jews and, later in life, dedicated himself to Marxist thought.  That he saw a 
similar mind in Carl Schmitt, often remembered as the Nazi party’s crown jurist, a man 
“willing to accept and justify the relentless civic degradation and expulsion of the Jews,” 
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suggests that their thought somehow transcended the external forms of their lives.6  The 
uniqueness of each man’s thought is apparent to anyone who reads a book of Schmitt’s 
political philosophy or Benjamin’s theses on history or art.  Because their theories are so 
distinct, historians often pay less attention to the events in their lives than to the content 
of their work.  Many historians do not mention their connection, and the ones that do tend 
to express disbelief that Benjamin professed admiration for Schmitt, or to emphasize the 
scandal that it implied.    
Carl Schmitt, born in 1888 in Plettenberg, was raised in a petty-bourgeoisie 
Catholic family.  Schmitt studied academic law as a university student, worked as a 
professor at various universities, and maintained a self-alienated existence.  Biographies 
and intellectual histories of Schmitt bear such titles as A Dangerous Mind and The 
Enemy.  The evolution of his work and career indicate why his name is synonymous with 
“the reckless mind.”7  During the Third Reich, Schmitt’s task was to create the Nazi 
party’s ideological foundation, and he wrote many anti-Semitic articles that seemed less 
analytical or philosophical, than absurd.  He also created one of the twentieth century’s 
most sophisticated and creative bodies of thought.  The distinctiveness of Schmitt’s 
theoretical work, both in content and style, make his inspirations and influences unclear.  
His theories do not ride the wake of any particular dogma.  For instance, although the 
theological traces in his work are evident, he did not intend a return to traditional 
Catholic thought.  But when he looked for “armament” to defend the traditional European 
state against its rise of revolution, he found political power in a religious “system” that 
gave primacy to transcendent identity over rational thought.  To call him a nationalist is 
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also misleading.  His “almost abnormal indifference to the national cause for an 
academic, and for someone who was neither on the Left nor a pacifist,” indicate that 
nationalism was not a driving tenet in his intellectual work.8 He wrote to defend the 
European order of states in general, but he drew his insights from the specific situation of 
Germany. To save the German state, Schmitt argued that it had to mobilize and unify 
against a common enemy or threat.  He defined the sovereign as the state’s redemptive 
agent, and he integrated a modern miracle, similar to the Biblical miracle, into his 
modern systems of theologically structured law.  
Benjamin was influenced early in life by Gustav Wyneken’s Youth movement; 
later, the Zionist movement had a determining role. Benjamin was mentored in his 
spiritual pursuits by his longest lasting friend, Gershom Scholem, who bonded with 
Benjamin after watching him debate on Zionism in 1915. Benjamin consistently sought 
the spiritual over the systematic in his philosophic writing and developed a passion for 
dissecting difficult theological text.  Many of Benjamin’s biographers, historians, 
admirers, and friends intentionally omit his self-proclaimed connection with Schmitt.  For 
instance, when Theodor Adorno, Benjamin’s friend and colleague, collaborated with 
Scholem in 1966 on compiling a collection of his correspondence in honor of his 
distinctive way of working out thoughts and ideas in letters to his friends, they left out his 
letter to Schmitt.  It is not surprising that they did this.  Scholem would not have wanted 
Benjamin remembered or represented in conjunction with Schmitt.  Adorno was opposed 
to disclosing Benjamin’s admiration for Schmitt for different reasons.  Adorno was 
affiliated with the Institute of Social Research, a group of critical theorists, with whom 
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Benjamin’s name was associated as well.  The institute was an independently funded 
group dedicated to reviving western Marxism in its pursuit of a new line of social 
research.  Adorno’s concern for the Institute’s reputation cautioned him against marring 
the legacy of Benjamin and, by association, that of the Institute by acknowledging a 
connection with Schmitt.  However, Adorno did not fully or consistently consider 
Benjamin’s work to represent the Institute’s methods either.  Benjamin’s use of 
theological elements, his search for redemptive possibilities in the modern state, and his 
interest in the obscure aspects of religious text like the Cabala, gave his societal critique 
more religious influence than the Institute’s members preferred.  Throughout the period 
that he worked for them, they tried to persuade him to adopt a more secular approach.   
Adorno found other elements to criticize in Benjamin’s philosophical method; he 
was particularly critical of the elements that aligned Benjamin further with Schmitt.  For 
example, Adorno wrote in a 1940 essay that Benjamin’s focus on total processes, 
mythical and historical, prevented him from emphasizing the boundaries of subjectivity: 
“Between myth and reconciliation, the poles of his philosophy, the subject evaporates.”9  
Schmitt more decisively broke down subjective boundaries, arguing that subjectivity 
divided the state and detracted from its larger purpose.  If Benjamin de-emphasized the 
subject, it was not because he considered subjectivity to be antithetical or oppositional to 
the historical process.  It was because he, instead, focused on history’s antithetical and 
oppositional relationship with myth.  From the perspective of subjectivity, however, 
Benjamin and Schmitt’s philosophies appeared less incongruent.  The initial question 
concerning what made their thought similar became one about what kept them apart. 
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But before exploring their subtler differences, their similarities must be more fully 
understood. Some historians claim that Benjamin and Schmitt’s connection is obvious.  
Mark Lilla finds it unsurprising that Benjamin found likeness with Schmitt, whose work 
was laden in religious content and rich in its style.  Benjamin’s fascination with the 
“moment when Europeans became conscious of the breakdown of the religiously ordered 
medieval world but before the birth of the modern,” made his engagement with Schmitt 
inevitable.10  Furthermore, their shared interest in theology was not their only 
commonality.  For example, both were fascinated with the expressive power of language, 
especially the different expressive capabilities of each particular language.  Schmitt 
originally intended to study philology at the Friedrich-Wilhelm University of Berlin 
before deciding to study jurisprudence.  He believed that language could be given an 
aesthetic that would make it battle-ready, useful in the political project of mobilization.11  
Benjamin also thought that language had hidden potentials, not ones that could be 
reached by adding more onto its external form, but ones that were hidden within.  
Benjamin claimed that language’s meaning could be unlocked by translating different 
languages into one another, allowing man to get closer to the language of God.  
 Whatever conjunctions existed in their work, however, Schmitt and Benjamin did 
not intend it to have the same effect.  Schmitt gave his language an aesthetic to make it 
political, not to make it poetic.  He indicated this in his critical examination of those who 
tried to escape the political by indulging in the aesthetic. In his 1919 essay, Politische 
Romantik, Schmitt defined his intellectual approach by criticizing two other philosophical 
currents that countered rational Enlightenment thought.  The first was that of the anti-
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revolutionary German Romantics.  Schmitt indicated his own political intentions by 
condemning their purely aesthetic ones.  He argued that the Romantics had neither found 
an indigenous pulse of political power nor defined their own unique political inclination.  
He more favorably esteemed the Romantics’ precedents: a lineage of thinkers from Fichte 
to Hegel that “contrasted the rationalism of Enlightenment by adopting  ‘the mentality of 
the miraculous,’ which celebrated passion and irrational desire.”12 As opposed to the 
Romantics, who escaped into their autonomous world, the latter group engaged with the 
authentic power that rose from the new ideas brewing in “Berlin of the reform era, 
epicenter of an intellectual revolution.”13 Although they tapped into an authentic source 
of political power, he believed their unsystematic antithesis to reason to be a “kind of 
play of ideas” that had no pertinent intent.  Schmitt departed from earlier efforts by 
creating an approach that was neither exclusively aesthetic nor celebrated solely in the 
margins of the political world.  
Benjamin made the Romantics the topic of his first academic dissertation as well, 
finding relevance in the aspects of their work that Schmitt opposed.  Schmitt objected to 
the formal qualities of the Romantics’ work, arguing that alienated spaces of human 
activity, including the artistic realm, were divisive of the state’s larger identity and truer 
purpose.  He attempted to combine all energies within the state, using the aesthetic to 
unify, totalize, and mobilize its people.  In contrast, Benjamin claimed that the 
Romantics’ formal qualities were the most important element of their work.  In a letter to 
Scholem in 1917 Benjamin compared the formal qualities of the Romantics to the formal 
qualities of theology: “romanticism seeks to accomplish for religion what Kant 
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accomplished for theoretical subjects: to reveal its form.”14 Benjamin argued that the 
work of art had to be autonomous in order to form effective social critique. The critical 
theorists would have agreed; they also used the autonomous work of art to inspire man to 
look critically at his world.  In their analysis of society, they used art forms “as a kind of 
code language for processes taking place within society, which must be deciphered by 
means of critical analysis.’”15  
The neo-Kantian inspired schools, prominent in the early interwar years, also 
conceptualized an ideal with which to change aspects of the real world.  Benjamin and 
Schmitt may have had different opinions about the Romantics, but they both opposed the 
efforts of neo-Kantians. If the Romantics constructed the ideal by using poetic devices, 
the neo-Kantians constructed their version by using normative and scientific systems.  
Schmitt formed his theories as antitheses to the neo-Kantian inspired legal positivists, a 
group of legal scholars that worked on the Weimar constitution.  The legal positivists 
created a “pure” body of law that they intended to be purely conceptual and unmarred by 
determinants in the chaotic world of humans and their affairs.  Benjamin belonged to a 
generation of Jewish thinkers who worked in opposition to the efforts of Hermann Cohen, 
one of the leading figures of the neo-Kantian school.  In Ethics of Pure Willing, Cohen 
developed a system of ethics with the intention of tying the individual to the idea of God. 
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Benjamin resisted Cohen’s systematic approach, preferring, instead, to seek redemptive 
possibilities within religious text.16  
The intersections and divergences of Benjamin and Schmitt’s thought and lives 
are at once obvious and shocking.  The puzzling connection of two of the twentieth 
century’s greatest thinkers, whose work is still being interpreted today, makes it 
important to examine them within the same frame.  This thesis is not the first to attempt 
such a comparison. 
Samuel Weber and Giorigio Agamben have written about Benjamin and Schmitt 
together, focusing on the connection of their ideas more than on the connection of their 
lives.  Agamben argues in his essay, Gigantomachy Concerning a Void, that, although 
Benjamin voiced his indebtedness to Schmitt, Schmitt was the one who initiated their 
exchange.  He argues that Schmitt developed his theory of sovereignty as a response to 
Benjamin’s 1921 essay, Critique of Violence.  Agamben bases his claim exclusively on 
the fact that Critique of Violence was published in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und 
Sozialpolitik, a journal that Schmitt read and to which he often contributed. Agamben 
argues that Schmitt created his concept of the decision as a response to Benjamin, who 
argued that violence in its pure form must remain external to the law.  By doing so, 
Schmitt preserved the sovereign’s ability to bring pure and ideal elements into the law by 
making the decision not a suspension of law, instead of a destruction of law.  This thesis 
agrees that Schmitt maintained the sovereign’s ability to introduce pure elements into the 
legal order.  This thesis diverges from the idea that the decision should be defined 
exclusively as an act of violence; it was not determined by the sovereign’s ability to make 
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an exception to the law; it was determined by his knowledge of when to do so. It was 
primarily determined by the sovereign’s knowledge about the truth of the state’s identity 
and what posed a threat to that identity.  
Samuel Weber has also interpreted Benjamin and Schmitt’s exchange of ideas.  In 
his book, Benjamin’s-abilities, Weber included a section dedicated to their interaction 
titled Taking Exception to Decision.  Weber argues that both used a “methodological 
extremism;” both determined the concept by its antithesis, not its general trait.  Although 
they used the same methodology, however, their concepts of sovereignty were different.  
While Schmitt defined the sovereign by his ability to make an exception to the law, 
Benjamin defined the sovereign by his decision against making an exception and by his 
“loss of a redemptive perspective.”17 According to Weber, Benjamin’s sovereign is left in 
resignation and can only “appeal for a miracle.”18 To make his argument, Weber uses 
Benjamin’s philosophy of history in comparison to Schmitt’s political philosophy. 
However, Benjamin specified in his letter to Schmitt that he intended his philosophy of 
art to be the primary source used in their comparison. Benjamin abandoned the idea that 
the sovereign could redeem the state; he did not abandon the idea that there were 
redemptive possibilities in the modern world. He made this argument in his philosophy of 
art. 
This paper aims to place Benjamin’s philosophy of art, developed in Origin, 
within the same frame as Schmitt’s political philosophy.  In doing so, it will highlight 
aspects of both that are insufficiently developed, and sometimes overlooked, when 
scholars compare Schmitt’s philosophy of the modern state to either Benjamin’s Critique 
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or his philosophy of history.  Most importantly, in his philosophy of art, Benjamin argued 
that knowledge had potential to redeem identity in a modern state in two different ways: 
the way that Schmitt envisioned, by presenting man with truth, and his own version, by 
giving man the ability to determine meaning.  This paper follows Schmitt’s thought first 
and begins with the line of argumentation he developed to claim that the miracle was a 
legitimate part of modern law.  It will then examine how his miracle redeemed the state’s 
true identity by reconciling the collective identity with that of the sovereign, achieving 
totality and indivisible unity with the political form.  This thesis will then examine 
Benjamin’s idea of redemption, beginning with his critical interpretation of Schmitt’s 
version, his innovation of Schmitt’s concepts, and the redemptive potentials he found in 
subjectivity and thought.  Finally it will examine the new forms that Benjamin’s miracle 




The ideas of Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin came from a political 
environment without a clear source of stability.  The rifts that ran through the state’s 
façade allowed artists and thinkers to tell its secrets, artists and thinkers who could 
interpret, not just the German situation, but the human condition and the constitution of a 
major European state when its political form threatened to fall apart.  Indeed, the artistic 
and intellectual interpretations that came from Weimar Germany provide a much richer 
assertion of German identity than did its political form at the time. The chance for a 
successful revolution was lost when the councils, which formed from the initial revolt in 
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1918, lost their voice in the formation of the Republic’s political foundation. The political 
form that the Republic eventually took was largely influenced by the vision of Friedrich 
Ebert, the monarchy’s instated leader, who envisioned a seamless transition from 
monarchy to parliamentary democracy for the new Republic. Instead, parliament was 
adopted arbitrarily and subsequently corroded into a negotiating ground for various 
interests and political parties.  The two camps that opposed the Republic were a radical 
faction of revolutionaries, who never gave up their revolutionary aspirations, and the 
conservative opposition.   
Germany faced powers no less hostile from the international community.  The 
signing of the Versailles treaty marked the end of the First World War, but it was not the 
victory for Germany or for Ebert, who only gained further hostility from across the 
political spectrum, that it was for Europe, in general, and for the interest of the United 
States, which was a new emerging superpower.  The treaty locked Germany into an 
indefinite number of years of economic reparations, occupation, and territorial 
annexation.  It was dearly felt by Germans, who had already suffered a long war, a lost 
generation, and the disillusionment that accompanied the deceptions about the purpose 
and outcome of the war.  Whether or not the Versailles treaty was morally justified, its 
reparations struck hardest at the Germans of the lower class, who experienced economic 
pain and expected to do so indefinitely.   
It is little wonder that ideas of miracles and redemption come from thinkers in this 
context.  As the German state moved into the modern age, religious themes reappeared in 
secular form, sometimes in an attempt to save an aspect of the past and sometimes in an 





To redeem his state, Schmitt defined the miracle of the twentieth century similar 
to the Biblical miracle, as the sovereign’s intervention in the law.  He identified the 
sovereign by his ability to know when an intervention was necessary.  In the opening line 
of his 1922 book, Political Theology, he explained the sovereign: “Sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception.”19 Just as he did with all of his concepts, Schmitt also defined 
the sovereign by what he was not; the “essence” of his authority was not his ability to 
coerce, nor was it his capacity to dominate.  Schmitt defined the sovereign by his ability 
to introduce a decision, knowledge derived from a realm external to the law, into a body 
of already determined law:  
Therein resides the essence of the state’s sovereignty, which must be juristically 
defined correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to 
decide.  The exception reveals most clearly the essence of the state’s authority.  
The decision parts here from the legal norm, and (to formulate it paradoxically) 
authority proves that to produce law it need not be based on law.20  
 
  The miracle was not a novelty in Schmitt’s thought.  In fact, it was thematically 
consistent with his overarching argument that all of the modern state’s concepts and 
systems were secularized theological ones.  The sovereign’s intervention in the law was 
introduced, in the third chapter of Political Theology, as the “exception in jurisprudence,” 
the modern equivalent of the Biblical miracle:  
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized 
theological concepts not only because of their historical development-in which 
they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state…but also because 
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of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a 
sociological consideration of these concepts.  The exception in jurisprudence is 
analogous to the miracle in theology.  Only by being aware of this can we 
appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas of the state developed in 
the last centuries.21 
 
 Because Schmitt argued that the “systematic structure” of modern law was 
similar to religious law, the miracle assumed an integral role in an already religiously 
patterned system.  Schmitt identified two types of theological law, theism and deism, 
with counterparts in the modern state.  Theism was constructed as a hierarchy of 
identities and observed the sovereign as the highest position of authority.  The deistic 
system observed only the laws of the rational world.  There was no invisible counterpart 
to its visible order and there was no exception to its rules.  Schmitt compared deism to the 
rationalism of the Enlightenment and the modern legal order; he compared theism to the 
counter-revolutionary and the personal sovereign: 
The idea of the modern constitutional state triumphed together with deism, a 
theology and metaphysics rejected not only the transgression of the laws of nature 
through an exception brought about by direct intervention, as is found in the idea 
of a miracle, but also the sovereign’s direct intervention in a valid legal order.  
The rationalism of the Enlightenment rejected the exception in every form. 
Conservative authors of the counter-revolution who were theists could thus 
attempt to support the personal sovereignty of the monarch ideologically, with the 
aid of analogies from a theistic law.22 
 
 Schmitt developed his concept of sovereignty and his legal theories during the 
legal debates over the German constitution after the First World War.  The monarchy’s 
collapse, in 1918, initiated the efforts of a group of aspiring legal scholars, who focused 
their attention on creating a system of law to replace constitutional monarchism.   In The 
Theory of Monarchy, a section of his 1928 book, Constitutional Theory, Schmitt 
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explained the monarch’s relationship to law.  The monarch was superior to the rules of 
both nature and men; he was the creator of both miracles and law.  “During a time in 
which the king performs miracles,” Schmitt wrote, “with his entire person he can be 
considered holy and inviolable, priest and the anointed of the ruling lord.  The king’s law 
is godly, that is of religious origin; the king himself is a governor of God.”23 His law was 
considered godly and was legitimate because it was of religious origin.  His person was 
considered godly because of his “inviolable” identity and his “entire person.”  He was the 
image of God and similar to a theistic sovereign, whose person also had supremacy over 
his system.  To replace the monarch and to redefine his role in the formation of 
constitutional law, the legal positivists proposed a legal order that functioned as a closed, 
deistic, system that did not have a ruling identity or a religious origin. The positivist order 
was legitimate because it was factual and empirical, not because it was godly.  Schmitt’s 
conceptualization of theistic and deistic law gave him a foundation with which to 
examine and explain the interaction between a transcendent sovereign and a closed 
system of law in a modern age. 
Schmitt claimed that, even after the monarchy’s collapse, the sovereign continued 
to exist-even if repressed- under the closed legal order.  Not only did the sovereign 
persist, Schmitt wrote, but he would, inevitably, emerge and transcend the rational legal 
order.  Schmitt argued, in two ways, that the sovereign had the legitimacy to interrupt the 
law.  First, he called attention to the limitations of the positivists’ system.  He analyzed 
the way that it worked, acquainting himself with its loopholes and all of its flaws.  
Schmitt formed his argument, specifically, as a polemic against the legal theories of Hans 
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Kelsen, the most radical of the legal positivists, who proposed a legal order most 
congruent with deistic law.  Kelsen proposed to replace the monarch’s identity by 
eradicating identity from the constitution altogether.  To erase all traces of identity, 
Kelsen argued that the constitution should be sterilized of human elements, natural 
elements, and equally uncertain and impure “sociological,” “psychological,” and causal 
elements.   The state’s new scientific and “methodological identity,” had no existential or 
divine characteristics; it further achieved neutrality by eradicating internal hierarchies 
that revealed sovereignty, personality, or identity in any recognizable form.  It was 
composed as a closed system of uniform norms that emanated from a similarly uniform 
basic norm.24   
The largest flaw in the normative ideal, one that Schmitt quickly identified, was 
the trait intended to be its biggest strength.  By erasing all human elements, Kelsen 
created a flawlessly normative ideal that was incompatible with the world of human 
events and affairs.  The law’s inapplicability to the real situation created a very large 
loophole in its gap-less order.  Because the normative order was applied to the situation 
with difficulty, it more efficiently affected the visible order by inspiring humans to 
replicate its façade and mimic its method with their thought and behavior.  The system 
occupied the equivalent of a transcendent realm; it stood above and reflected onto the 
real, creating: “a regularity, an evenness, derived from repeated practice and professional 
reasoning.”25  Schmitt admitted that a methodological system could create regularity in 
the status quo, but he argued that it could not defend the state from an extreme threat.  He 
                                                        
24
 Peter C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: 
The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (London: Duke University Press: 
1997), p. 49. 
25
 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology p. 38. 
  21
argued that the system’s limitations would be exposed in a situation that eluded its legal 
norms.  The extreme situation would also initiate the sovereign’s emergence, when the 
system fell through and “real life [broke] through the crust of a mechanism that has 
become torpid by repetition.”26 When a hole was worn through the modern state’s façade, 
the sovereign identity would emerge, and the tale of its creation would be told. 
Schmitt legitimized the miracle also by establishing the sovereign’s ability to 
transcend the law.  The sovereign could not claim legitimacy by virtue of his godly 
essence and so had to claim his superiority over the rational system in another way.  
Schmitt thus developed his idea of the decision, arguing that it was derived from the 
sovereign’s access to a “pure” place of origin, similar to the “religious origin” of the 
king.  The secular sovereign was not the maker of law, but his decision enabled him to 
be, like the monarch, the maker of miracles.  His decision gave him legitimacy to enact 
the modern miracle, “the exception in jurisprudence” when he determined that the state’s 
true identity was under threat and with the intention of redeeming the state.27 
Schmitt argued that the sovereign’s decision was superior to the normative order 
because it originated in realm that transcended and preceded the law: “Looked at 
normatively, the decision emanates from nothingness.”28 The decision was also 
qualitatively different than the legal norm; it was purer and alien within its system:  
“Every legal thought brings a legal idea, which in its purity can never become reality, 
into another aggregate condition and adds an element that cannot be derived either from 
the content of the legal idea or from the content of a general positive legal norm that is to 
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be applied.”29  Not only was the decision different than the norm, it was different than 
other forms of thought as well.  For example, the certainty demanded of the sovereign in 
his decision-making role was different than the certainty demanded of men in their 
commercial and economic pursuits.  Schmitt argued that the sovereign’s decision and the 
calculated decision should be neither compared nor confused:   
The certainty of the decision is, from the perspective of sociology, of particular 
interest in an age of intense commercial activity because in numerous cases 
commerce is less concerned with particular content than with a calculable 
certainty…the legal interest in the decision as such should not be mixed up with 
this kind of calculability30 
 
Schmitt also determined that the decision was not subjective; it could not be defined 
psychologically: “This has nothing to do with the causal and psychological origins of 
such a decision.”31  The importance of Schmitt’s distinguishing the decision from 
calculable, factual, and subjective thought was that he made it theological, an alien 
element within a rational or empirical order.  In his 1934 book, On the Three Types of 
Juristic Thought, Schmitt argued that the decision transcended normative, calculable, 
psychological, and measurable thought because it was divine:  
It returns this concept of grace, which statute thinking continually attempts to 
normativize and relativize, back to its rightful place of deserved incalculability 
and immeasurability; it takes it out of a humanized normativistic order and places 
it back where it belongs in an exalted Divine order above human 
normativization.32   
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The superiority of the sovereign’s decision was not attributed to its predictability or 
certainty.  It was superior because of its content and because it revealed and represented 
the truth of the state’s identity. 
Schmitt introduced the “pure” decision within the law, as a redemptive measure 
of the state after the war, when revolutionary threats posed a greater threat than before. 
The sovereign used the decision to break the law by suspending it, revealing a 
representation of truth.  Schmitt argued that the decision was a representation of truth by 
claiming an opportunistic perspective.  To legitimize a miracle, he needed only to predict 
that the law would meet a situation that it could not explain.  The miracle was enacted in 
“ the moment of the true exception, a moment that norms could not predict.” It was the 
moment that the professionals were incompetent to handle:  “Who is responsible for that 
for which competence has not been anticipated?” The sovereign suspended the law when 
the normative order failed to provide rules to meet real threats. 
The sovereign’s exception to the law did not redeem the state in its isolated act; it 
redeemed the state only by what followed, beginning with the sovereign’s reunification 
of the state under a solitary ruler.  In the fourth chapter of Political Theology, On the 
Counterrevolutionary Philosophy of the State, Schmitt gave concrete examples of leaders 
that could assume sovereignty in the modern state.  The dictator and the “conservative 
authors of the counter-revolutionaries who were theists” were introduced as such 
sovereigns.33 Schmitt specifically named French and Spanish counter-revolutionaries, 
Donoso Cortés and Louis Gabriel Ambroise de Bonald, as exemplary sovereigns; they 
were distinguished from other men the same way that the decision was distinguished 
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from other forms of thought.  For example, Bonald was able to recognize the evil 
inherent in other men; he was “clear about the fundamentally evil instinct of man and 
recognized the indestructible ‘will to power,’ as do modern psychologists.”34  Schmitt 
considered the dictator to be purer than the other, power hungry men.  In fact, he 
considered the dictator to be more like the godly monarch than the ordinary individual.  
Cortés would have agreed.  He too compared dictatorship to monarchy, and he concluded 
that the only way to redeem the state from the depravity of man was to demand the 
enactment of dictatorship:  
As soon as Donoso Cortés realized that the period of monarchy had come to an 
end because there no longer were kings and no one would have the courage to be 
king in any way other than by the will of the people, he brought his decisionism to 
its logical conclusion. He demanded a political dictatorship.35  
 
Dictatorship was, indeed, the first political form that was instated after the 
sovereign’s exception to the law.  In his 1921 Die Diktatur, and in his 1923 The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt explained that dictatorship redeemed the modern 
state, specifically the modern German state, by unifying the people within the existing 
democratic form.  In both books he argued that dictatorship was not only compatible with 
democracy but was also an intermediate step between the existing democracy and a true 
form of democracy.  If the sovereign preserved the law by suspending it, the dictator did 
the same for democracy: he “suspends democracy in the name of a true democracy that is 
still to be created.  Theoretically, this does not destroy democracy, but it is important to 
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pay attention to it because it shows that dictatorship is not antithetical to democracy.”36  
Dictatorship suspended a democratic form with separated powers and initiated a 
democratic form that would return to its “originary condition,” by reunifying power 
within the body of the commander:   
‘Within the space [of positive law], a return to the originary condition takes place, 
so to speak, the military commander acts [within it] like the administrating state 
prior to the separation of powers: he decides on concrete measures as means to a 
concrete goal, without being hindered by statutory limits.”37  
 
 
Dictatorship was not the final expression of Schmitt’s version of true democracy.  
He returned to and evolved his work on dictatorship in 1931 when the increasingly dire 
situation within Germany drove him to seek leadership with which to unify the state 
along more substantial terms.  Accordingly, in Guardian of the Constitution, Schmitt 
argued in favor of the executive’s even greater license to transcend the constitution.   
Schmitt’s idea of true democracy was a democracy without parliament or other divisive 
institutions; it was a democracy that, instead, bypassed liberal institutions to unify the 
pure power from above with the awakening power from below.  The sovereign decision, 
an assertion of identity and truth, redeemed the state by instating a true form of 
democracy in which the ruler and the ruled united in realization of a common identity:  
As democracy, modern mass democracy attempts to realize an identity of 
governed and governing, and thus it confronts parliament as an inconceivable and 
outmoded institution.  If democratic identity is taken seriously, then in an 
emergency, no other constitutional institution can withstand the sole criterion of 
the people’s will, however it is expressed.38 
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In the early 1920s, Schmitt found an even more fulfilling political form with 
which to redeem German identity in Mussolini’s Fascist regime. Unlike the party- 
oriented version of fascism that Hitler offered, Mussolini’s version integrated itself 
seamlessly with the state.  One reason that Schmitt found fascism attractive was that it 
united people according to their common identity by inspiring their collective belief in a 
myth. Schmitt first became interested in myth, as a cohesive agent of the state, when he 
read the work of Georges Sorel.  Schmitt, “agreeing with Sorel on the sheer power of 
myths to generate the enthusiasm and courage necessary for any great moral decision,” 
particularly liked Sorel’s irrationalist version of myth, as an alternative to the Marxist, 
intellectual, version that he did not endorse.39  In his effort to totalize the political form, 
myth allowed Schmitt to utilize his aesthetic capabilities and give full expression to 




To the extent that Schmitt delighted in the fantastic power of a society united by 
myth, Benjamin delighted in the novelties of a world stripped by myth.  Although 
religion influenced his writing and thought, Benjamin did not believe that it would return 
in an old form.  And if Schmitt conceptualized the miracle to revive a state of order, 
Benjamin wrote about the German tragic drama to describe of a world without heroes or 
order, a world “suffused with the melancholy of statesmen, tyrants, and martyrs, who 
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[were] wracked by guilt.”40  He did not deny theology’s presence or power in a modern 
age.  On the contrary, he argued that theological concepts were necessary to understand 
secular forms of representation, like the tragic drama, or the Mourning Play.  For 
instance, he claimed that the secular version of the tragic drama, the Trauerspiel’s “ 
Content [could not] be elucidated without the aid of theological concepts, which 
were indispensible even to its exposition…For a critical understanding of the 
Trauerspiel, in its extreme, allegorical form, is possible only from the higher 
domain of theology; so long as the approach is an aesthetic one, paradox must 
have the last word.  Such a resolution, like the resolution of anything profane into 
the sacred, can only be accomplished historically in terms of a theology of 
history.41 
 
Benjamin did not deny theology’s presence in a secular state, and he did not give up on 
redemptive possibilities.  He denied that a transcendent authority could fulfill redemptive 
aspirations in a modern state.   
Accordingly, Benjamin defined the sovereign by his decision against transcending 
the law and his decision against using his executive powers.  More specifically, he 
defined him as the “the representative of history,” the one with “dual insight,” who knew 
that transcendent redemptive aspirations were fallacies and misguided truths in a secular 
age.42 If Schmitt’s decision was legitimate because if its transcendent origin, Benjamin 
countered Schmitt’s claim by redefining origin.  Origin, for Benjamin, was not an 
external realm; it was, instead, an immanent moment in time.  According to Benjamin, 
origin was the conceptual moment of an idea, the moment that determined what it would 
become.  And if a phenomenon could only find redemption by returning to its origin, then 
by redefining origin Benjamin redefined redemption as well.  According to Benjamin, 
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redemption was neither an act of man nor a return to genesis.  Instead, redemption was 
the fulfillment of an idea, and it could only occur at the end of the idea’s historical life. 
Origin [Ursprung], although an entirely historical category, has, nevertheless, 
nothing to do with genesis [Entstehung].  The term origin is not intended to 
describe the process by which the existent came into being, but rather to describe 
that which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearing.  Origin is an 
eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it swallows the material 
involved in the process of genesis.  That which is original is never revealed in the 
naked and manifest existence of the factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a dual 
insight.  On the one hand it needs to be recognized as a process of restoration and 
reestablishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as 
something imperfect and incomplete.  There takes place in every original 
phenomenon a determination of the form in which an idea will constantly 
confront the historical world, until it is revealed fulfilled, in the totality of its 
history.43 
 
Benjamin’s sovereign played an insignificant, if any, role in the fulfillment of an idea, 
and he knew his limitations. He decided to forego transcendence and chose, instead, a 
less brilliant representation.  But although Benjamin defined the sovereign by his lost 
redemptive actions, he did not argue against redemptive possibilities.  Benjamin found 
redemptive possibilities in thought, reflection, and contemplation that awakened man’s 
consciousness. 
 It is important to look beyond Benjamin’s philosophy of history and his 
redefinition of origin to fully understand his response to Schmitt.  Otherwise, the 
redemptive possibilities that Benjamin suggested are lost.  In his philosophy of art, 
Benjamin claimed that the work of art had redemptive powers that were similar to those 
of the miracle.  The work of art and the miracle could both interrupt the repetitive laws of 
nature by providing man with the philosophical laws of meaning: “The only 
philosophical laws which have any place in the work of art are those which refer to the 
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meaning of existence…There is no need for events to follow a pattern which conforms to 
the laws of nature; a miracle can just as easily evoke this sense.”44  
In his philosophy of art, Benjamin introduced two different forms of art, the 
symbol and the allegory.  Each redeemed man differently.  While the symbol promised to 
redeem man by giving him truth, the allegory promised to redeem man by giving him 
meaning.  Benjamin argued that one must understand both formally before understanding 
how they succeeded or failed at fulfilling their redemptive promises. First, Benjamin 
explained the form of the symbol, which was a representation of truth; he argued that 
truth was beautiful, and therefore he also defined the symbol by its beauty.  Here 
Benjamin aligned with Plato, claiming that an “understanding of the Platonic view of the 
relationship of truth and beauty is not just a primary aim in every investigation into the 
philosophy of art, but it is indispensable to the definition of truth itself.”45 In fact, the 
symbol, the monarch and the sovereign were all defined by their “indivisible unity,” and 
the inviolability of their external form.  Benjamin argued that man’s attraction to a 
unified form did not require, and even resisted, his use of intellect.  In his explanation of 
the symbol’s power, Benjamin referenced Plato’s Symposium and described Eros’ 
relationship to truth and his pursuit of its beauty.46 He follows it,  
but as its lover, not as its pursuer; so that for the sake of its outward appearance 
beauty will always flee: in dread before the intellect…the content, however, does 
not appear by being exposed; rather it is revealed in a process which might be 
described metaphorically as the burning of the husk as it enters the realm of ideas, 
that is to say a destruction of the work in which its external form achieves its most 
brilliant degree of illumination.47 
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Benjamin argued that flawless unity of any inviolable identity or gap-less order, although 
perhaps beautiful, was a lie.  Furthermore, once man knew this, its beauty would 
disappear: “Its beauty as a symbol evaporates when the light of divine learning falls upon 
it.  The false appearance of totality is extinguished.”48  
Man was drawn to the symbol, according to Benjamin, in the same way that man 
was drawn to the sovereign, according to Schmitt.  However, Schmitt did not consider 
man’s alignment with the sovereign to be symbolic, he considered it to be political. He 
expressed this in his 1927 The Concept of the Political: “The friend and enemy concepts 
are to understood in their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols.”49 
Nor did Schmitt intend to achieve totality symbolically; he, instead, abolished the 
symbolic realm altogether and aspired to reconcile the ruler and the ruled by means of 
identification within political form.  Benjamin would argue that totality, achieved by this 
type of alignment, was established with a lie. 
If the symbol promised redemption by giving man truth, the allegory promised 
redemption by giving him meaning.  Although the allegory was not inviolable, it was no 
less divine than truth.  Allegory even had the potential to save man from his attraction to 
the symbol: “Where man is drawn towards the symbol, allegory emerges from the depths 
of being to intercept the intention, and to triumph over it.”50  Benjamin considered the 
allegory, the written language, and the act of textual exegesis all to have divine powers. 
While the divine power of the written word was the act of writing itself and the holy act 
of codification: ”The sanctity of what is written is inextricably bound up with the idea of 
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its strict codification,”51 the divine power of textual exegesis was the act of unlocking the 
meaning hidden within codified religious text.  Only allegory had redemptive powers, 
however, and it redeemed man, first, by redeeming his subjective capacity for thought. 
“Subjectivity, like an angel falling into the depths, is brought back by allegories, and is 
held fast in heaven, in God, by ponderación misteriosa.”52 The allegory had redemptive 
potentials that man could use to reconcile with his past, redeem himself from guilt, and 
salvage the events of his history, all by interpreting them and imparting them with 
meaning: “the more nature and antiquity were felt to be guilt-laden, the more necessary 
was their allegorical interpretation, as their only conceivable salvation.”53  Although the 
allegory’s origin was immanent, it was no less divine than the sovereign’s transcendent 
decision.  The allegory was divine, not because it emanated from a transcendent realm, 
but because it referred and “pointed” to something that transcended the visible world:   
But it will be unmistakably apparent, especially to anyone who is familiar with 
allegorical textual exegesis, that all of the things which are used to signify derive, 
from the very fact of their pointing to something else, a power which makes them 
appear no longer commensurable with profane things, which raises them onto a 
higher plane, and which can, indeed, sanctify them.  Considered in allegorical 
terms, then, the profane world is both elevated and devalued.  This religious 
dialectic of content has its formal correlative in the dialectic of convention and 
expression.54 
 
Benjamin dedicated the second and third section of Origin to his interpretation of 
the Mourning Play, discussing the meaning that it imparted to the events that littered 
man’s historical evolution.  Important for our purpose is his comparison of the Christian 
mystery-play, in which the sovereign had access to the beyond, with the its secular 
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version, the Trauerspiel, in which the sovereign’s action was restricted to “a context of 
strict immanence, without any access to the beyond of the mystery plays and so, for all 
their technical ingenuity, limited to the representation of ghostly apparitions and the 
apotheoses of rulers.”55 If the sovereign of the German Trauerspiel was defined by his 
loss of a redemptive perspective, the sovereign of the Spanish Trauerspiel was, 
alternatively, defined by his attempt to redeem the state by enacting his executive powers.   
The sovereign of the Spanish Trauerspiel could be considered an allegorical 
interpretation of Schmitt’s dictator, and not just because of their similarities.  In his letter 
to Schmitt, Benjamin specified that Schmitt’s work on dictatorship confirmed his own.  
Even if Benjamin did not mention why he found Schmitt’s work influential, it is only 
important to know that Benjamin referenced Schmitt’s dictatorial theories before he 
formed his own thoughts.  In his description of the Spanish Trauerspiel, Benjamin 
explained the actions of the sovereign who, like Schmitt’s sovereign, attempted to redeem 
the state.  While Schmitt considered the dictator to be analogous to the monarch, 
however, Benjamin presented the dictator as more of a tyrant than a monarch: 
The theory of sovereignty, which takes as its example the special case in which 
dictatorial powers are unfolded, positively demands the completion of the image 
of the sovereign, as tyrant.  The drama makes a special point of endowing the 
ruler with the gesture of executive power as his characteristic gesture…56   
 
Benjamin interpreted the Spanish Trauerspiel of Calderón as a way of imparting 
meaning to the actions of a ruler who enacted the miracle as Schmitt envisioned.  
According to Benjamin’s interpretation of Calderón, the sovereign who made an 
exception to the law did not transcend the boundary that demarcated man from monarch.  
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Instead, he overestimated his capabilities and, consequently, transcended the 
demarcations of his sanity; the dictator “ends in madness.”57  The tyrant’s moment of 
glory, which found him basking in his newly found power, was also the moment of his 
greatest defeat.  His actions marked a failed attempt to save his state because, in an 
attempt to redeem it from the evil of its men, he failed to recognize his own evil, his own 
will to power, and his own humanity: “And so there is this one thing to be said in favour 
of the Caesar as he loses himself in the ecstasy of power: he falls victim to the 
disproportion between the unlimited hierarchical dignity, with which he is divinely 
invested and the humble estate of his humanity.”58 Furthermore, without basing his 
actions on his knowledge of the past, Benjamin argued that the tyrant would be unable to 
make the decisions that his role necessitated, that he would be unable to initiate anything 
new.   The tyrant’s impulsive act, then, marked not only his personal defeat, but also the 
downfall of the state he attempted to save:  
This is the indecisiveness of the tyrant. The prince, who is responsible for making 
the decision to proclaim the state of emergency, reveals, at the first opportunity, 
that he is almost incapable of making a decision. For their actions are not 
determined by thought, but by changing physical impulses.59  
 
According to Benjamin, the emergence of the dictator could not fulfill mankind’s 
redemptive aspirations.  Benjamin found miracles in the seventeenth century, claiming 
that “the work of art [was] just such a miracle.”60 However, the baroque artists faced a 
dilemma: they looked for ways to create a unified art form while working only with 
fragments.  According to Benjamin, the exasperated authors of baroque literature 
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resigned.  Their resignation left them with an appeal for a miracle.  Hoping to achieve 
formal totality “miraculously,” they incessantly piled up fragments. “For it is common 
practice in the literature of the baroque to pile up fragments ceaselessly, without any 
strict idea of a goal, and, in the unremitting expectation of a miracle.”61 The creators of 
the baroque theatre created a total work of art out of fragments by using aesthetic 
techniques such as framing, miniaturization, and the subsidiary plot to unify their 
representation: “these aspects of reflection are equally essential: the playful 
miniaturization of reality and the introduction of a reflective infinity of thought into the 
finite space of a profane fate. For the world of drama of fate is‐to anticipate our 
conclusions‐a self‐enclosed world.”62 The creators of the baroque drama did not limit 
their expressive capabilities by enclosing the representational space.  They, instead, 
added embellishments and achieved greater depth by receding space further back into the 
form.  Their method was oppositional to the method of Schmitt, who broke down 
enclosed spaces and aestheticized the political form externally.  
In the late 1920s, after turning to Marxism, Benjamin looked for twentieth century 
art forms to act as “just such miracles.”  In Origin, Benjamin examined baroque art’s 
potential to interrupt a natural progression of time by imparting historical events with 
meaning.  His discussion of twentieth century art focused on its ability to interrupt the 
laws of capitalism by inspiring revolution.  Adorno was happy with Benjamin’s turn 
away from theology and toward Marxism.  Adorno argued that art had always guided 
mankind from one stage of development to the next.  He claimed that in a capitalist age, 
however, art had been divested of its potential to inspire social change.  For example, 
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whereas classical music was once used to discipline man’s emotions and turn him into a 
rational being, in a capitalist society, it was transformed into an object of consumption.  
The distracted and unreflective modern man fetishized the concert tickets and the singing 
voices, valuing them as indications of social distinction; he consequentially forewent the 
experience of art, which alone had the potential to change him.  The critical theorists 
looked for ways to rediscover the hidden potential of art, but they debated which art 
forms could evolve society forward, through a capitalist age.  
 Figures in the foreground of the debate were Institute members such as Theodor 
Adorno, Georg Lukács, Ernst Bloch, and Walter Benjamin.  Benjamin’s embrace of 
Marxism inspired his interest in the writing of Bloch and Lukács; all three had become 
“disenchanted with the esoteric, quasi-elitist formulations of their early work 
and…turn[ed] to Marxism as a more generalizable, historically adequate solution to the 
problem of a regenerated humanity.”63  Benjamin, Bloch, and Lukács all considered the 
work of art as a means of realizing Marxist ideology in reality, but all three slightly 
disagreed with which art forms were most capable of inspiring revolution.  
Their debate over the expressionist art movement, in the 1920s, exemplified their 
specific points of divergence, as well as their more general ideas about how art could 
perpetuate or stagnate social change.  The biggest question was whether or not an 
individual’s expression of his subjective experience could inspire a mass movement like 
revolution.  Benjamin’s answer to this question is present in Origin, where he insinuated 
that subjective thought was a necessary step toward the “fully developed consciousness 
                                                        
63 Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), p. 16. 
  36
of the community.”64 In contrast, Lukács argued no; he claimed that the expressionists’ 
art could not inspire social change; expressionist art could not even be understood by 
anyone other than the individual who created it.  In his essay, Realism in the Balance, 
Lukács criticized the expressionists for “leaping into the air and clinging to the clouds;” 
he argued that they had divorced from reality to the extent that it was not even used as a 
springboard for the development of their imaginations.65  Most importantly, he claimed 
that by giving individual experience a form, the expressionist hindered revolutionary 
progress, which depended on forward motion in order to be realized.  The expressionists 
ossified what should have only been a transition phase between ideologies, 
 
Stabiliz[ing] both intellectually and artistically what was essentially a merely 
transitional ideological phase…But the revolutionary significance of such phases 
of ideological transition lies precisely in their fluidity, in their forward 
movement…in this case stabilization meant that the Expressionists…prevented 
[man] from making further progress of a revolutionary kind.66 
 
Others argued that subjectivity was not antithetical to revolutionary progress.  Bloch 
came to the defense of the expressionists in his essay, Discussing Expressionism; he 
claimed that expressionist art was revolutionary, but that it was just, “different; it was 
composed partly of archaic images, but partly too of revolutionary fantasies which were 
critical and often quite specific…even if it was undisciplined and uncontrolled.”67 
Adorno and Lukács’ debate over the formal characteristics of the novel, like the 
debates over expressionism, centered on ways in which to reconcile subjectivity and 
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objectivity while also critiquing capitalism.  More specifically, their debate concerned the 
perspective of the narrator and whether he could reference his life in capitalist society 
without reinforcing and endorsing capitalism.  Lukács maintained that the narrator had to 
make the objective world the starting point of narration and that even subjective “feelings 
grow out of the life of society.”  Instead of drawing the reader into his inner world, the 
narrator should illustrate “what area of society [the emotions] arise from and where they 
are going to.”68  Adorno agreed, in his essay The Position of the Narrator in the 
Contemporary Novel, that reconciliation was important, but that, in a capitalist society, it 
was only possible by divorcing from a false reality, a fraudulent surface appearance, and 
creating one free from its laws.  “The narrator establishes an interior space, as it were, 
which spares him the false step into the alien world.”69  He noted the narration of Marcel 
Proust, who opened his novel upon the narrator’s fall into a state of sleep, “the narrator 
raises a curtain: the reader is to take part in what occurs as though he were physically 
present.”70  The closing of his eyes marks the moment that the reader is invited into his 
dream world and embarks in his subjective life, free from a false reality. 
Benjamin used the montage form to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity.  He 
argued, in his 1930 essay The Crisis of the Novel, that the author did not have to choose 
between divorcing his narration from reality, by using the interior monologue, and using 
reality exclusively as the milieu of his narration.  Instead, he collided fragments of reality 
with subjective experience.  
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Petty-bourgeois printed matter, scandalmongering, stories of accidents, the 
sensational incidents of 1928, folk songs, and advertisements rain down in this 
text…The montage explodes the framework of the novel, bursts its limits both 
stylistically and structurally, and clears the way for new, epic possibilities.  
Formally, above all.71   
 
In Origin, Benjamin stressed the importance of reconciling subjectivity and 
objectivity not only within the artistic representation, but also in the philosophical 
system.  Here he specified particular twentieth century philosophical systems that omitted 
subjectivity from their orders.  For example, pragmatism referred to man as its object, an 
external element, of its unified system, not its origin:   
Where art so firmly occupies the centre of existence as to make man one of its 
manifestations instead of recognizing him above all as its basis, to see man’s 
existence as the eternal subject of its own creations instead of recognizing him as 
its own creator, then all sane reflection is at an end.  And whether, with the 
removal of man from the centre of art, it is Nirvana, the slumbering will to life, 
which takes his place, as in Schopenhauer, or whether it is the ‘dissonance 
become man’ which, as in Nietzsche, has created both the manifestation of the 
human world and man himself, it makes no difference; it is the same 
pragmatism.72 
 
The humanists were also guilty; they created a unity of essence that failed to 
integrate subjectivity.  Benjamin claimed that the humanists’ unity of essence was just as 
false as other inviolable forms: “Such kinds of Humanism or Renaissance are arbitrary, 
indeed they are false because they give life, with its multiplicity of sources, forms, and 
spirits, the false appearance of real unity of essence.”73 
Traces of Benjamin’s eventual Marxist thought are apparent in Origin in his 
description of baroque architecture as well.  Here he emphasized the reconciliation of its 
                                                        
71 Walter Benjamin, “The Crisis of the Novel,” in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, 
vol. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 301. 
72 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, p. 301. 
73 Ibid., p. 40. 
  39
base of support and its rising structure.  Whereas Schmitt’s dominating sovereign created 
unity in the political form by reconciling the identity of the ruler and the ruled, Benjamin 
called attention to the dominating power of wonder inspired by collective works that 
were creations of the builders as much as they were creations of the master designer: 
“The Aristotelian idea of [wonder], the artistic expression of the miracle (the Biblical 
[sign]), is what dominates [art and architecture too].” Benjamin claimed that the base 
provided a firm foundation so that the aspiring accoutrements could reach even further 
skyward from their place at the top.  He wrote about the width of its columns, the power 
suggested by its pedestals, and the emphasis of strength carved deeply into its pilasters.  
He claimed that the real might held the structure’s weight so that the embellishments at 
the apex could soar: “What other function have they than to emphasize the soaring 
miracle above, by drawing attention to the difficulties of supporting it below. The 
ponderación misteriosa, the intervention of God in the work of art, is assumed to be 
possible.”74  
Benjamin and Schmitt both valued the total form, but for Schmitt it was the form 
of the state, and he decided to fight to keep it whole, even at the expense of the integrity 
of its people.  Benjamin loved Germany no less, but he made different choices.  He 
fought to preserve subjectivity and he fought to preserve thought.  He let the political 
form fall apart, and he thought no less of it, even at the moment of its greatest ruin. When 
Benjamin wrote about the German Trauerspiel, it is most likely safe to assume he was 
writing about his home.  In an attempt to redeem his state, Benjamin told the story of its 
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powerful design and the majesty of its structure that was made most apparent when a hole 
was worn in its façade, and it fell apart:  
The powerful design of this form should be thought through to its conclusion; 
only under this condition is it possible to discuss the idea of the German 
Trauerspiel. In the ruins of great buildings the idea of the plan speaks more 
impressively than in lesser buildings, however well preserved they are; and for 
this reason the German Trauerspiel merits interpretation. In the spirit of allegory 
it is conceived from the outset as a ruin, a fragment. Others may shine 







Before concluding, it is important to introduce one more thinker into the 
conversation between Benjamin and Schmitt and use one more concept of the miracle to 
elucidate the relationship between theirs. Although Hannah Arendt did not acknowledge 
indebtedness to Schmitt, her concept of the miracle has a significant relationship to his.  
In fact, it is almost systematically antithetical to his concept.  If his miracle was initiated 
with a thought that emanated from nothingness and that returned man to his past, 
Arendt’s was an action that emanated from nothingness and pointed man purposefully 
into the future.  If Schmitt’s miracle promised redemption by abolishing the status quo, it 
did so at the expense of aspiring to anything new. Arendt defined the miracle exclusively 
as something new, which seemed like a promising solution.  The only example she could 
find of something entirely new in the world of man, however, something with no history 
and without extremes yet needing reconciliation, was the birth of a child:  
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The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, 
‘natural’ ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is 
ontologically rooted.  It is in other words, the birth of new men and the new 
beginning, the action they are capable of by virtue of being born.  Only the full 
experience of this capacity can bestow upon human affairs faith and hope, those 
two essential characteristics of human existence which Greek antiquity ignored 
altogether, discounting the keeping of faith as a very uncommon and not too 
important virtue and counting hope among the evils of illusion in Pandora’s box.  
It is this faith in and hope for the world that found perhaps its most glorious and 
most succinct expression in the few words with which the Gospels announced 




Arendt’s miracle could have been a response to Benjamin as well.  If Benjamin 
suggested that man could confront his past with contemplation and thought, Arendt 
responded by salvaging thoughts from religion, faith and hope, which had no reference to 
the past and suggested, instead, a brave endeavor into something unknown. By turning 
decisively away from the past, however, Arendt implied that reconciling with it was 
futile, that man could only deny it and hope that it would go away.  Furthermore, by 
suggesting that natality was man’s sole ability to begin something new, Arendt suggested 
that the thoughts, events, and memories of man’s past would be, at best, dissipated 
gradually as they disappeared with the rise and fall of each generation.  Even worse is her 
implication that all of the world’s hope resided within souls untainted by that world.  And 
does she claim that by turning a blind eye to the past, it will not come back in new forms?  
Will not new inviolable truths reappear in new forms and lead new generations down the 
same old paths?  Perhaps without reconciling the past, without doing as de Vries suggests 
and opening the archive of Christian symbols and myths to examine what they once 
meant, we submit to their reemergence, as Lefort claims, and the possibility that they 
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will, at times of weakness, break through the edifice of the state.  When Arendt suggested 
that man turn away from the past, she also suggested that he had no potential to use his 
thought to reconcile the old before initiating something new.  She also denied that man’s 
unique ability to interpret and reflect on history was as much a part of his identity as is 
his ability to start something new.   
Benjamin may have claimed the last word in the debate on miracles. He argued 
that the miracle was not a decisive turn from the past. He emphasized the importance of 
thought.  He emphasized the importance of confronting the past, of giving it meaning, 
before ushering in something new. He also emphasized the importance of historical time; 
he acknowledged the small, yet no less crucial, role of the subjective man who had, 
throughout history, been forced to resign from redemptive hopes in the visible world and 
to forego asserting or representing his identity.  Perhaps the miracle, then, comes at the 
perfect moment, when the old has been fulfilled and when humans have learned from 
past adventures, in action and thought, and know how to make the decisions required of a 
new beginning. Benjamin described this moment by defining the perfect work of art 
which, like the single gesture of God in Exodus, reconciled the past with the very same 
act that embarked mankind on an entirely new adventure:  “A major work will either 
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